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Abstract 
The functional safety is applied to the public safety monitoring system. Based on optimized three-dimension risk matrix, the safety 
integrity level (SIL) of public safety monitoring system is studied. The research indicates that other independent layers of protection, as a 
supplementary, can safeguard the public safety monitoring system lacking of protection. The number of people in a public place is not 
considered in the optimized three-dimension risk matrix which causes the SIL derived from the three-dimension risk matrix to be rather 
backward-looking. So the number of independent protection layers or (and) the SIL of a safety function safety monitoring system should 
be decreased accordingly and make the individual risk is properly below the acceptable individual risk of the public safety. It is suggested 
that the functional safety of the public safety monitoring systems should be researched specially. 
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1. Introduction 
The public safety concerns nature disaster, industry accident calamity, public health incidents and social security event. 
With the fast development of information technique, internet, the internet of things and cloud computing etc. are applied 
widely to the public safety monitoring system. The reliability of safety monitoring system and information security are put 
forward accordingly. The safety monitoring system is a kind of safety related system (SRS) based on the 
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic technique and IEC61508 is the fundamental standard. At present, IEC61508 
has been applied in industry fields, such as nuclear industry, process industry and mechanical industry etc. But there is no 
any research about the functional safety for public safety monitoring system. The industry accident calamity belongs to 
public safety field, so the safety instrumented system (SIS) used in industry is a kind of the public safety monitoring system. 
The SIS is made up of sensor, logic controller and actuator, but some public safety monitoring system doesn’t have specific 
sensor or actuator. For example, the video monitoring alarming system has no sensor, but its annunciator can be as actuator. 
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In a word, the public safety monitoring system also complies with IEC61508. In this paper, the extension of the functional 
safety to the public safety monitoring system is discussed and how to define the SIL of public safety monitoring system 
based on the optimized three-dimension risk matrix is showed.  
2. An optimized three-dimension risk matrix 
2.1. Constructing risk matrix for the public safety incident 
The risk matrix was advanced by purchase group of American air force electron system center in April, 1995and was 
applied to risk management of American weapon development project[1]. The risk matrix is a method based on 
classification, which is described by the qualitative description or quantitative index. Because the data of public safety 
incident are usual inadequate, it is only to take qualitative method to make certain the occurrence likelihood and 
consequence of incident. In view of productivity level and economy status, the likelihood and consequence measurement of 
public safety incident are shown in the table 1 and table 2[2, 3]. The likelihood and consequence of incident can be 
concluded from the risk analysis referring to table 1 and table 2 and then by two-dimension risk matrix appeared in table 3, 
the level of risk can be ascertained [4]. 
 
Table 1. Measurement of occurrence likelihood for incident 
Level Occurrence frequency (/year) Explanation Description 
A İ10-6 Impossible  Not happened in scope of assessment and impossibly happened in similar area or industry 
B 10-6~10-4 Less likely  Not happened in scope of assessment and similar area/industry happen occasionally  
C 10-4~10-2 Possible  
Assessment of range occurred and similar area/industry also 
occur occasionally; not happened in scope of assessment but the 
similar area/industry higher frequency 
D 10-2~10-1 Likely  Assessment in the context of higher frequency 
E ı10-1 Very likely Assessment in the context of occurrence frequency of high 
 Table 2. Measurement of occurrence consequence for incident 
Level Explanation Description 
1 Quite little No casualty, light property loss, no bad social public opinion and political influence 
2 Common 
Less than 3 death and less than 10 grievous bodily harm, immediately mitigating the 
accident by local disposal at the first time, medium property loss, lesser social public 
opinion and usually no political influence 
3 Great 
More than 3 and less than 10 death or more than 10 and less than 50 grievous bodily harm, 
mitigating the accident by exterior rescue, great property loss or compensation, bad social 
public opinion at some extension and some political influence 
4 Serious More than 10 and less than 30 death or more than 50 and less than 100 grievous bodily harm, severe property loss, bad social public opinion and great political influence 
5 Especially serious 
More than 30 death or more than 100 grievous bodily harm, huge property loss, extremely 
bad social public opinion and political influence 
Note 1: In this table, “more than” including the value, “less than” excluding the value. 
Note 2: The death toll and the grievous bodily harm number refer to the “Work Place Accidents Report, 
Investigation and Disposal Ordinance” (the No. 493 Order of State Department). If there is classification of accident 
consequence for other region or industry, the correlated regulation can be put into practice.  
Table 3. Risk matrix (Risk classification table) 
Risk 
Consequence 
Quite little Common Great Serious Especially serious 
1 2 3 4 5 
Likelihood 
A Impossible Low Low Low Medium Medium 
B Less likely Low Low Medium Medium High 
C Possible Low Medium Medium High Very high 
D Likely  Medium Medium High High Very high 
E Very likely Medium High High Very high Very high 
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2.2. An optimized risk matrix for the public safety incident 
The table 3 presents the original risk level of public safety incident, among which the low level of risk is tolerable and 
marked as “0”. The preventive measures for the low level of risk can be kept and it does not need the public safety 
monitoring system. But the medium, high and very high levels of risk require the public safety monitoring system or other 
technology safety-related system and external risk reduction facility to reduce the risk to the tolerable level. In general, other 
technology safety-related system and external risk reduction facility are completely independent and they can reduce the 
risk. Therefore, the independent protection layers are added to the table 3 to construct the three-dimension risk matrix, in 
which the risk level considered the independent protection layers is converted into the safety integrity level needed by the 
public safety monitoring system, as shown in Fig. 1. The SIL in the Fig. 1 is not obtained from the reduced risk comparing 
the risk taken the safety measures with the tolerable risk. In fact, the tolerable risk is included in the risk matrix. The method 
that converts the levels of risk considered the independent protection layers into the safety integrity levels is back-looking. 
Note: E/E/PE (Electrical/Electronic/Programmable electronic) safety-related systemsˈother technology safety-related 
system and external risk reduction facilities are independent protection layers to reduce the risk. Other technology safety-
related system is the safety-related system based on a technology other than electrical/electronic/programmable electronic, 
such as a relief valve. External risk reduction facility is the measure to reduce or mitigate the risks which are separate and 
distinct from, and do not use E/E/PE safety-related systems or other technology safety-related systems, such as a drain 
system, a fire wall and a bund [5]. 
 
Likelihood
Consequence
2 3 4
0
2
Indepe
ndent
protecti
on
level
Safety intigrity level
B C D E B C D E
4+
4
- 3
4++
4
2 4++
4+
4
1
0
3
1
4
3 4++ 4+++
4 4+
1
2
3 4
5
B C D E
3
4+
2
1
4
3
4++
4
1
A B C D E A A A
1
0
2
1
0
1
0
-
3
4
2
1
2
0
1
2
0
4+
3 - - 1 2
4+
3 - -
2
3
4++
4+
4
3 - 0 2 3
4++
4+
4 - 0
4+
2
4+++ 4+++
4++
4+
4
 
Fig.1. Optimized three-dimension risk matrix 
 
2.3. Determination of safety integrity level 
For simplifying the three-dimension risk matrix, the “quite little” consequence of incident, with it's number of death 
being “0”, is not considered in Fig. 1. According to Fig. 1, the SIL is ascertained by the level of risk which is determined by 
the likelihood, consequence and the number of independent protection layers. 
In Fig.1, the sign “+” , “++” and “+++” indicate that the SIL of public safety monitoring system and the number of 
independent protection layers cannot satisfy the risk reduction and need other technology safety-related system and external 
risk reduction facilities. For example, a work group made up of engineers and operators analyze a safety instrumented 
function recommended by the risk analysis. They classify the likelihood and consequence of the incident into “D” and “3” 
referring to the table 1 and table 2. According to Fig. 1, the SIL of a safety instrumented function is “4++” without 
independent protection layers, which shows that the SIL4 of a safety instrumented function is not satisfied with the 
requirement of a public safety system. It needs another 2 independent protection layers or takes measures of SIL3 of a safety 
instrumented function and 3 independent protection layers. 
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3. Verification for the optimized three-dimension risk matrix 
3.1. Theory validation 
The classification of risk matrix is not only qualitative but also quantitative. The SIL is the quantitative description for 
the required reduction of risk. Because the required reduction of risk is a numerical value and the tolerable risk can be 
calculated, the SIL of the risk matrix can be validated. This is the correction of the risk matrix. The correction can 
standardize the SIL of the risk matrix. That is to say, not only SIL1 but also SIL3 are all consistent to the same standard. If 
the consequence of the public safety incident keeps constant, there is “Eq. (1)” referring to the appendix C.3 of IEC61508-5 
[6]. 
PFDSIF= 0ffT                                                                                         (1) 
Where PFDSIF is the reduction of risk after introducing the public safety monitoring system, Tf  is tolerable occurrence 
frequency of incident (/year), 0f  is initial occurrence frequency of incident (/year). 
The tolerable death rate is as follows, 
PLLff TTI u [7]                                                                                      (2) 
Where TIf  is tolerable death rate (/year), PLL is potential loss of life at a time. 
The individual risk (IR) is the individual death rate every year [8]. It can be gotten from “Eq. (3)”.  
  IR= NfTI                                                                                               (3) 
Where N is the number of people in a public place. 
At present, the standard of tolerable risk mostly takes the number of fatality as the risk measurement [9]. The tolerable 
risk of public safety makes no exception. The tolerable risk is an acceptable risk in the given range considering factors such 
as society, country, regional economy, moral and circumstance etc [7]. There is no related data of tolerable risk issued in 
China. Indicated from a HSE report  about nuclear power plant, the individual risk (IR) of worker and public people are 10-
3 per year and 10-5 per year respectively[10]. These are considered as the boundary of tolerance zone. The IR of UK’S 
Health and Safety Executive is IRHSEİ10-6/year. The standard is different according to different people, such as, IRHSE
İ10-3/year for worker and IRHSEİ10-6/year for crowd. In Holland, Australia and Canada etc., the tolerable risk is all 
under 10-6 per year[11]. In Hong Kong, the tolerable risk of a new construction factory is 10-6 per year [12]. In conclusion, 
once the public safety related to nature disaster, industry accident calamity, public health incidents and social security event 
took place, the masses would die. In this paper, 10-6 per year is taken as the tolerable individual risk of public safety.  
Once ascertaining the consequence and likelihood of a pane in matrix, the tolerable occurrence frequency of incident can 
be calculated according to “Eq. (1)”. The tolerable death rate and the individual risk can be obtained respectively from “Eq. 
(2)” and “Eq. (3)”. Comparing “IR” with the tolerable individual risk standard (10-6 per year), it is proved that the adoptive 
safety measures are enough to ensure public’s safety if the calculated individual risk is equal or less than 10-6 per year. 
The risk matrix is usually corrected according to the worst case, but in this way, the result is more conservative. In some 
companies or organizations, there is a more normative correction process. A sampling value is selected from the range of 
consequence or likelihood, which denotes all the values range and is used to correct the risk matrix. This method is more 
reasonable, so it is suggested to use the sampling value to correct the risk matrix. 
3.2. Example validation 
For example, a public safety incident is likely to occur and its consequence is grave. According to table 1, the occurrence 
likelihood of the incident is “D”, that is to say, the occurrence frequency of the incident is 10-2 ~10-1 per year. In the light 
of table 2, the occurrence consequence of the incident is “3”, namely the death toll of incident is 3~10. In line with table 3, 
the risk of the incident is “high”. In accordance with Fig. 1, the safety integrity level of a safety function for the public 
safety monitoring system is more than 4 without any independent protection layer, namely taking a safety function of SIL4 
and two independent protection layers. If three independent protection layers are introduced, the safety integrity level of a 
safety function for the public safety monitoring system is 3. The validations of the two kinds of SIL for a safety function are 
as follows. 
(1) SIL4 and two independent protection layers 
Under the low demand mode of operation, the average probability of failure to perform its design function on demand 
corresponding to SIL4 is 1.0×10-4 (taking the upper limit). Considering the two independent protection layers, the reduced 
risk is 1.0×10-2. 
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Taking the medium value of the “D” for occurrence frequency, that is 0f =0.5×10-1. The PLL of the “3” for occurrence 
consequence of incident is 3~10, and its medium value is 6. If the number of people in a public place is 100, then by “Eq.      
(1)”, “Eq. (2)” and “Eq. (3)”, the calculation results are shown as follows. 
Tf =PFDSIF× 0f =1.0×10-4×1.0×10-2×0.5×10-1=0.5×10-7/year˗ 
TIf =PLL× Tf =6×0.5×10-7=3.0×10-7/year˗ 
IR= 100100.3
-7u =3.0×10-9/year 
(2)SIL3 and three independent protection layers 
Under the low demand mode of operation, the average probability of failure to perform its design function on demand 
corresponding to SIL3 is 1.0×10-3 (taking the upper limit).  Considering the three independent protection layers, the 
reduced risk value is 1.0×10-3. 0f , PLL and N are all same as the above. Then by “Eq. (1)”, “Eq. (2)” and “Eq. (3)”, the 
calculation results are same as the above. 
From the above results, IR is far below 1.0×10-6 per year which means that the two kinds of safety protection systems 
are all over protections. It is needed to decrease the number of independent protection layers or reduce the SIL. That is to 
say, the safety protection system can be a public safety monitoring system with SIL of a safety function is 4 or made up of 
one independent protection layer and a public safety monitoring system with its SIL of a safety function is 3 etc. In a word, 
the reduction of risk is 1.0×10-4 by the public safety monitoring system and (or) the independent protection layers. 
In like manner, the optimized three-dimension risk matrix has been validated by the sampling values, which indicates 
that the SIL is mostly over-high and it should be corrected because of not thinking of the number of people in a public place. 
So the SIL of a safety function and the number of the independent protection layers should be determined by the fact of 
public safety system.  
4. Results and discussion 
This paper regards the tolerable individual risk as 10-6/year after researching. For the risk of “2D” and “4D” in the 
optimized three-dimension risk matrix, the individual risks with protection measures are the critical values (10-6 per year) 
by sampling validation. But for the extreme case of the risk of “2D” and “4D”, the safety measures presented by the 
optimized three-dimension risk matrix are inadequate, which need other measures. 
Of course, there is over protection in using the sampling to validate. For example, the individual risk of other pane of 
optimized three-dimension risk matrix except for “2D” and “4D” are all 6.0×10-7 per year. It is below the tolerable 
individual risk (10-6 per year). 
In addition, it is pointed out that the death toll from the “5” for incident occurrence consequence is more than 30, but in 
validation, the sampling value is taken as 60, lacking of protection is possible. So it is recommended to use the actual death 
toll from the risk assessment to validate. 
The number of people in a public place is not considered in the optimized three-dimension risk matrix. Once the number 
of people in a public place is considered in validation, the individual risk is far below the tolerable individual risk. So the 
SIL of a safety function or (and) the number of the independent protection layers should be reduced properly. For instance, 
if the number of people in a public place is 10, one independent protection layer can be decreased or the SIL of a safety 
function can be reduced 1 level. If the number of people in a public place is 100, two independent protection layers can be 
decreased or the SIL of a safety function can be reduced two levels. The rest may be deduced by analogy. 
5. Conclusions 
The functional safety is introduced into the public safety monitoring system and the optimized three-dimension risk 
matrix is extended from industrial areas to the field of public safety. The independent protection layers are taken into 
account except for the safety monitoring system in the optimized three-dimension risk matrix and thought of as the 
supplement safety measures to settle the under protection of the safety monitoring system. 
The number of people in a public place is not considered in the optimized three-dimension risk matrix. Once the number 
of people in a public place is considered in validation, the individual risk is far below the tolerable individual risk. So the 
SIL of a safety function or (and) the number of the independent protection layers should be reduced properly. 
Because of the public safety monitoring systems are mostly based on the computer and internet techniques, their working 
environment is much better than the industry environment and they are more reliable than the safety instrumented systems. 
It is suggested that the functional safety of the public safety monitoring systems should be researched specially. 
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